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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the
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) To render ineffective the control structure by which the Soviet and Chinese communist regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries.
) To prevent, so far as practicable, the formation or retention, after the war, of military power in potentially hostile states sufficient to threaten the security of the US.

((Is 6 inconsistent with 4? 4 implies that US has need to deter (CHICOMS) even during "general war"; is deterrence ever consistent with totally decentralized decision-making? Continued need for some central coordination. Implications for targets to be hit in first wave in general war; need for holdback, discriminating Go message, delayed Go messages; continued threat-capability.

Conflict with GEOP

General war: In the event of general war, a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the US are overtly engaged, the basic military objective of the US Armed Forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc ((cf. above)) to a degree which will assure the accomplishment of the US national objectives in order to preserve the security of the US and its fundamental values and institutions...In a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset.

General war may be initiated either by the Soviets with an atomic onslaught with little or no warning, or may be the result of hostilities short of general war which were not initially intended to lead to general war.

... (strategic defense)

During initial phase, US atomic capability would be exploited fully, to the end that enemy military losses and the loss of the war-making capability directly supporting enemy forces would be such as to either a) bring about his capitulation ((NOTE: requirements)) or b) provide a margin of relative advantage to the US and its Allies sufficient to assure victory in the subsequent phase of operations.

Subsequent phase would be a continuation of the initial phase operations (?) probably at reduced atomic intensity, and follow-up offensive operations to achieve victory ((NOTE: concept and requirements)) and attain allied war objectives. Ultimate strategy adopted and duration and outcome of this phase will depend largely on the relative advantage (Note) achieved in the initial phase and the remaining relative capabilities.

Prior to outbreak of general war which developed as an outgrowth of a local or limited war, US might achieve significant degree of mobilization, deployment and commitment of resources. Such deployments might not improve our posture for general war. But...attack by SU following this might leave greater allied capability than following surprise attack, because of greater alertness and preparedness.

Objectives in event of general war with Soviet Bloc:

4) Divide, as practicable, the peoples and armed forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China from their Communist regimes and the peoples of the satellites from their Soviet-dominated regimes; and so far as possible enlist the active support of these peoples on the side of the US and its Allies in prosecuting the war against the Soviet regime.

US and its Allies reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. A basic aim of US military policy is to deter the Sino-Soviet Bloc from using its military power. Hence, during a period of cold war or short of general war, it is the policy of the US to affect

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Kinds of war the US should plan for, in order of probability of occurrence:

- 1) Cold war.
- 2) Military conflict short of general war.
 - a) War of limited objectives with or without the use of atomic weapons.
 - b) ~~Military~~ War initially of limited objectives but with high potential for uncontrolled expansion, with or without the use of atomic weapons.
3. General war.
 - a) General war resulting from hostilities short of general war which were not initially intended to lead to general war.
 - b) General war preceded by a period of strategic warning, or general war initiated by a Soviet surprise attack.

Although military operations short of general war are not intended to provoke general war, military or political conditions might be created which would precipitate the initiation of general war by the USSR. Further, the US, under expanding military operations, might achieve a significant degree of mobilization. Therefore, the deliberate initiation of general war by the USSR under these conditions is considered to be unlikely. It would obviously be more advantageous to the USSR to initiate general war by a surprise atomic attack on the US.

((To make this consistent with 3 above--though it may not really be consistent--3a must be split into "general war started by US" and "general war started by SU", with the latter less likely than 3b.

Anyway, this estimate is based only on one aspect of the situation; in other ways, SU might be in better position to launch general war; anyway, pressures to do so might override.))

17. In the event of general war, a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the US are overtly engaged, the basic military objective of the US Armed Forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a degree which will assure the accomplishment of the US national objectives in order to preserve the security of the US and its fundamental values and institutions.

Mobilization Base: Pre D-day planning for mobilization will improve our capabilities to conduct general war which might result from hostilities short of general war. Also provide for peripheral wars.

((NOTE: not intended to improve capabilities in general war resulting from SU surprise attack.))

e. Provide pre-D-day stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the US reasonably protected to insure that those forces surviving the enemy atom c attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively despite substantial interruption of resupply from the US during the initial phase of war.

...Mobilization, under the conditions of cold war or military conflict short of general war...

Basic undertakings: general war:

a. General:

- 1) Destruction or neutralization of the Soviet capability for delivery of atomic weapons.
- 2) The defeat of the Soviet Bloc military forces.
- 3) The destruction or neutralization of the Soviet Bloc war-making capability.
- 4) Control of essential portions of the land, sea and air.
- 5) Protection and utilization of the strategic locations in the northern hemisphere as bases for the launching of operations against the USSR and as bases for the defense of the US.
6. Mobilization of reserve forces...

e. Far East-Southeast Asia: